Personnel involved in United Nations (UN) peace operations have been found to commit misconduct, some of which amounts to criminal conduct. The UN has been working to establish a disciplinary system which will prevent and punish any misconduct by peace operation personnel. However, the UN cannot prosecute criminal perpetrators.
Introduction
Misconduct by personnel involved in United Nations (UN) peace operations has become the subject of much discussion in recent years; particularly as such misconduct may amount to criminal conduct. The discussion has resulted in significant change within the UN system. New rules, regulations, agreements and resolutions have been adopted, with the goal of reducing or hopefully eliminating misconduct, and punishing those who do commit offences. One of the most significant factors highlighted by the UN in preventing and punishing misconduct is the role of superiors and commanders. 3 There was found to be a perception that 'neither the [UN] nor its civilian managers and military commanders are held to account to make good-faith efforts to address the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations'. 4 A peace operation is primarily a military operation; the majority of personnel are military. A peace operation is inevitably hierarchical. As part of this hierarchy, the UN has specifically adopted instruments that task superiors and commanders with preventing misconduct and taking steps to ensure offenders are punished. For example, in relation to command responsibility, under Article 7 sexiens of the Model Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), sending state governments are obligated to take action if national contingent commanders fail to cooperate with a UN investigation, fail to exercise effective command and control, or neglect to immediately report to appropriate authorities or take action in respect of allegations of misconduct reported to the commander. 5 It is the contingent commanders' 'obligation to maintain the discipline and good order of the contingent'. 6 The commander's fulfilment of such requirements shall be evaluated in the commander's performance appraisal.
have been some success with this policy already, with the Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) reporting that contingent commanders have been repatriated for failures to ensure prevention of SEA.
Criminal jurisdiction of military personnel and civilian police is exclusive to the sending state; civilian personnel are subject to host state jurisdiction. 8 However, this does not preclude absolutely the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC can exercise its jurisdiction when a state is unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute a case. 9 This article will assume that jurisdictional conditions for prosecution before the ICC have been met, 10 including that a crime has been committed that falls within the jurisdiction of the Court. 11 Discussion will be on the issue of command and superior responsibility as a form of criminal liability under Article 28 of the Rome Statute. 12 An outstanding element of the military is the high level of discipline enforced, through a unique system of discipline and the hierarchical structure. Part of this expects certain conduct from commanders as they exercise control and command, giving them a higher level of responsibility.
With regard to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, a similar responsibility is also applicable to civilian superiors. That is a responsibility not only to avoid the direct commission of a crime, but also to prevent and punish crimes by subordinates. A violation of this responsibility will incur criminal liability under Article 28 of the Rome Statute. Given the hierarchical structure of a peace operation, and the proximity of a mission to armed conflict (or involvement in such conflict), it is particularly relevant to consider how Article 28 liability would be applicable in peace operations. The adoption of the rules and regulations referred to above has repercussions for liability for criminal conduct.
In this article, 'command responsibility' will be used to refer to responsibility of military commanders, and 'superior responsibility' will refer to responsibility of civilian superiors. The first section will briefly outline the development of command/superior responsibility in international criminal law, before summarizing the elements of command and superior responsibility as it progressed prior to the Rome Statute. Section 2 will outline the authority, command and control structure of a peace operation. It is particularly important to understand this when considering the application of command and superior responsibility in a peace operation, as the structure is more complex than a national military hierarchy. Section 3 will examine the application of Article 28 to crimes committed during peace operations, and the complications that may arise.
Development of Command/Superior Responsibility in
International Criminal Law 15 The commander/subordinate relationship does not have to be de jure authority, but can be de facto, which is 'sufficient to occasion liability of the commander' (or superior). 16 What it is important is the 'actual possession of control over the actions of subordinates, in the sense of material ability to prevent and punish the commission of crimes, as the crucial criterion'. 17 Thus, 'it is a commander's degree of effective control, his material ability, which will guide the [Court] in determining whether he reasonably took the measures required either to prevent the crime or to punish the perpetrator'. 18 With regard to civilian superiors, this has been defined by the ICTY in
Čelebic´i as having 'the possession of effective control over subordinates, which requires the possession of material abilities to prevent subordinate offences or to punish subordinate offenders'. 19 In the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) case of Musema, the Trial Chamber established that Musema exercised de jure authority over employees of the Tea Factory at which he was a superior. 20 This authority was exercised while they were on the premises of the Tea Factory and while engaged in their professional duties as employees, 'even if those duties were performed outside factory premises'. 21 Musema was found to have legal and financial control over employees, as he had the power to appoint and remove employees. In particular, the Chamber noted that Musema was in a position, by virtue of these powers, to take reasonable measures, such as removing, or threatening to remove, an individual from his or her position at the Tea Factory if he or she was identified as a perpetrator of crimes punishable under the Statute. The Chamber also finds that, by virtue of these powers, Musema was in a position to take reasonable measures to attempt to prevent or to punish the use of Tea Factory vehicles, uniforms or other Tea Factory property in the commission of such crimes. The Chamber finds that Musema exercised de jure power and de facto control over Tea Factory employees and the resources of the Tea Factory. 22 The case of Yamashita has been widely criticized for its imposition of a very high threshold of command responsibility. 23 Yamashita was convicted of 'unlawfully disregarding and failing to discharge his duty as a commander to control the acts of members of his command by permitting them to commit war crimes', despite being located nowhere near the troops and without attribution of knowledge of the crimes being committed. 24 However, the doctrine developed somewhat in subsequent cases. A significant distinction of command/superior responsibility from other forms of criminal responsibility is that it is responsibility by omission. The commander or superior is held liable for a failure to discharge their duty or obligation (to prevent or punish crimes by subordinates), rather than an act they have carried out. 25 This is opposed to responsibility being accorded directly for the actions of subordinates through strict liability. Strict liability removes the element of mens rea, which would result in a commander/superior being held liable for an offence committed by a subordinate even thought the commander/superior did not have the requisite mens rea to commit the offence (eg intent, knowledge, etc.). 26 In the High Command Case, the concept of strict liability was rejected. 27 It has also been rejected in cases before the ad hoc tribunals. 28 A commander is not held responsible by mere fact of position alone; rather, there must be some kind of intent involved, and if not malicious intent, at least negligence. 29 Case law has set the standard for knowledge required by a commander/superior. A commander/superior is held responsible if they knew or had reason to know that crimes were going to be, were being committed, or had been committed by their subordinate. The ICTY held that the knowledge could be actual knowledge, demonstrated by direct or circumstantial evidence, or constructive knowledge, which puts the commander/superior on notice that further investigation is necessary. 30 Cases have held that it is the duty of a commander to know about activities occurring within the scope of his/her power, although it has been recognized that a supreme commander could not possibly be aware of every detail of a military operation. 31 The ICTY has clarified that a commander is liable if:
(1) he had actual knowledge, established through direct or circumstantial evidence, that his subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes . . . or (2) where he had in his possession information of a nature, which at the least, would put him on notice of the risk of such offences by indicating the need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether such crimes were committed or were about to be committed by his subordinates. 32 The Trial Chamber went on to state that 'in the absence of direct evidence of the superior's knowledge of the offences committed by his subordinates, such knowledge cannot be presumed, but must be established by way of circumstantial evidence'. 33 In order to determine such knowledge, the ICTY suggested the following factors to take into consideration: In addition to knowledge, the commander/superior must have taken necessary and reasonable measures to prevent a crime or to punish the perpetrator of the crime. These measures must be within the competence of the commander/superior. 35 The commander/superior will not be held responsible if they did not have 'the material ability to prevent and punish the commission of the offences'. 36 It is the failure to carry out these necessary and reasonable measures 'within his material possibility' 37 that render the commander/superior criminally responsible-it is, essentially, a dereliction of duty to not prevent or punish the crime. 38 However, the ICTY has recognized the difficulty in imposing a standard on what is necessary and reasonable: 'any evaluation of the action taken by a superior to determine whether this duty has been met is so inextricably linked to the facts of each particular situation that any attempt to formulate a general standard in abstracto would not be meaningful'. 39 Hence, what measures are necessary and reasonable is to be determined based on the individual circumstances of the case. The ICTY has held that the commander does not necessarily have to personally mete out the punishment; that 'under some circumstances, a commander may discharge his obligation to prevent or punish an offence by reporting the matter to the competent authorities'. 40 It is in the context of these elements of the doctrine of command/superior responsibility that Article 28 of the Rome Statute was formulated and it will be interpreted.
Authority, Command and Control Structure of a Peace Support Operation
Command and superior responsibility is of particular importance in relation to offences committed by peacekeeping personnel. The importance of managerial (superior) and commander responsibility has been recognized by the UN, which has taken a compliance-based approach and a risk assessment approach to managerial compliance. The Model Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) now contains specific provisions obligating sending states to take action when a commander fails 'to cooperate with a UN investigation, fail[s] to exercise effective command and control, or neglect[s] to immediately report to appropriate authorities or take action in respect of allegations of misconduct reported to the commander'. 41 It is the commander's 'obligation to maintain the discipline and good order of the contingent'. 42 Fulfilment of these obligations forms part of a commander's performance appraisal.
These obligations offer an effective starting point from which to examine the criminal responsibility of a peace operation superior or commander for crimes committed by subordinate personnel. However, first it is necessary to give an outline of the command structure with a peace operation. A peace operation is multi-dimensional in its authority, command and control distribution. 43 There are three dimensions: strategic, operational and tactical. 44 The strategic aspect of an operation consists of defining objectives and overall planning of general operations. 45 Operational and tactical command deals with the attainment of these objectives in the field.
The ultimate authority of a peace operation is the Security Council, which issues the mandate of the mission, and any subsequent alterations to this mandate. The mandate ultimately controls the direction of the mission operations. 47 The Security Council is essentially the head of the strategic dimension of an operation. 48 Under 
Application of Article 28 of the Rome Statue to Peace Support Operations

A. Command Responsibility
The first requirement of Article 28(a) is that there exists a superiorsubordinate relationship. The most important aspect of this relationship is not the rank of the superior, but the fact that the commander had command or authority over the subordinate. 57 Command results in responsibility for those subordinates underneath a commander. 62 The commander must exercise effective command or authority 'at least when the crimes were about to be committed', and at the time of the commission of the crime. 63 A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander will be held criminally responsible for crimes committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces. 64 Thus, in the case where a subordinate peacekeeper commits a crime, in order to establish command responsibility, the person or persons who exercise effective command and control, or effective authority and control, over that subordinate, need(s) to be determined. 65 The ICC has noted some determining factors that may be taken into account include official position; the power to issue or give orders; the capacity to ensure compliance with the orders; the commander's military position and associated tasks; the capacity to order forces or units to participate in hostilities; the capacity to change command structure; the power to promote, replace, remove or discipline any force members; and the authority to allocate and withdraw forces. 66 The use of both 'command' and 'authority' provides for different superiorsubordinate relationships. Command is the power to issue orders. 67 
70
Command responsibility is a crime by omission-failure to act-rather than a crime committed by positive actions. 71 To fulfil duties that demonstrate control is properly exercised, a commander must ensure his forces are adequately trained in IHL; ensure that due regard is paid to IHL in operational decision making; ensure that an effective reporting system is established so that he or she is informed of incidents when violations of IHL might have occurred; monitor the reporting system to ensure it is effective; and take corrective action when he or she becomes aware that violations are about to occur or have occurred. 72 Requiring a commander to fulfil certain duties indicates that responsibility is attributed when the crime would not have been committed but for the failure of the commander. 73 The crime would not have occurred had the commander fulfilled his duties; as such actions would have prevented the crime from occurring. 74 However, responsibility is also attributed when 'the superior's failure of supervision [merely] increases the risk that the subordinates commit certain crimes'. 75 It must also be noted that the crime must have been committed; a commander cannot be held responsible under the Rome Statute for a mere failure to exercise control if no crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court were actually committed. 76 Failure to exercise such control by a commander may be proven with regard to the duties of commanders that are imposed by the UN, including under the MoU, which specifically obligates the sending state to take action if a commander fails to exercise effective command and control. 77 As a specific example, commanders are tasked with the implementation of programmes and policies of the UN for the prevention of SEA. They are being assessed on how they perform these duties. It is clear what method and means of control and authority commanders have and are expected to carry out in order to prevent and ensure accountability for SEA. 78 Thus, they have the material ability and power to prevent and punish such misconduct. 79 The
Prosecutor would be able to use this as evidence (particularly the UN assessments of performance) to determine whether a commander had failed to exercise control over the forces.
Failure to take all necessary and reasonable measures is the second element of omission triggering responsibility, and is the crux of command/superior responsibility. 80 A commander who fails to exercise effective control but does take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or repress the crimes or to submit the matter to the competent authorities will not be held responsible when subordinates have committed crimes. The failure to take necessary and reasonable measures can be committed intentionally or with negligence. The necessary and reasonable measures must be within the legal competence and the material possibility of the commander. 81 The failure to prevent or repress or submit to the competent authorities follows the principle detailed above that command responsibility is based on a failure to act rather than imputed liability for the subordinate's actions. 82 Thus, the mens rea required is one of negligence rather than intent, differentiating Article 28 responsibility from Article 25 criminal responsibility. 83 Prevention of a crime takes priority over actions to punish an act.
'Obviously, where the accused knew or had reason to know that subordinates were about to commit crimes and failed to prevent them, he cannot make up for the failure to act by punishing the subordinates afterwards.' 84 Prevention of a crime stops the crime when it has not yet been committed. Repression of a crime takes place by a commander when a crime is already in the process of being committed. Reporting of the crime to the competent authorities takes place after the fact, with the aim of reporting intended to ultimately result in punishment of the offender through triggering of investigation. 85 It is notable that Article 28 only requires a commander to prevent or repress the commission of crimes, or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. This is in contrast to the phrasing found in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, which expressly include command responsibility for failure to punish. 86 It is also distinct from customary law, which has developed the requirement to punish perpetrators of international crimes. 87 However, the ICC has elected to interpret 'repress' as encompassing two separate duties at two different stages of the commission of the crimes-a duty to stop ongoing crimes, and to punish forces after the commission of crimes. 88 The duty to punish may involve the commander taking necessary measures or by referring the matter to the competent authorities, and which duty is applicable will depend upon the circumstances of the case. 89 Command responsibility may ultimately be attributed to the Force A commander is not required to actively search for information but must acknowledge any information already available to him, and failure to take notice of such information will incur liability. 94 What the commander knew or should have known will depend on the individual circumstances of the case. 95 One notable aspect of this provision is that it applies to situations where forces 'were committing or about to commit crimes', but not where a commander knew or should have known that crimes had been committed.
This phrasing leaves a gap in the reach of the Court, as on strict application of Article 28, it cannot hold a commander responsible for failure to report a crime he becomes aware of only after it has been committed. 96 It can only be assumed that the Court will interpret this wording broadly, to This logic would also apply to commanders ranked under the Force Commander, depending upon their area of command, authority and control.
Contingent commanders would likely only be held responsible for the actions of members of their own contingent, as they do not exercise any authority, control or command over members of other national contingent.
Responsibility of any commander would have to be assessed by analysing over which subordinates a particular commander held authority, command and control, either de facto or de jure. 98 However, there may be problems with the determination of authority.
Despite the projected command/authority hierarchy in a mission, the reality is unfortunately that national contingent members sometimes refuse to acknowledge the de jure authority and command (as appointed by the Force Commander) of a commander originating from a different sending state. 99 This is a problem that has been recognized by the UN. For example, national contingents in UNOSOM 100 were not following mission orders, but instead were following orders from their sending state command, who were also applying mission orders at their own discretion. 103 Thus, the national contingent commander, whose orders the subordinate was actually following, and therefore had actual or effective control of the subordinate, could be deemed to have de facto authority. 104 At the same time, given the fact that a national contingent leader is responsible for the discipline and good order of national contingent members, and thus has the effective control and material ability to prevent and punish, the national contingent member could also be found to hold de jure authority in this regard. Given the fact that a contingent member is receiving orders from two sources, the national commander and the UN commander, 105 the result is that there are two different commanders who may be held responsible for the actions of the subordinate.
Yet responsibility only attaches if the commander knew (actual knowledge) 106 or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known (negligence in failing to acquire knowledge) 107 However, even in the latter case, this would not necessarily absolve the Force
Commander of responsibility. For example, it is the responsibility of commanders, including the Force Commander, to be aware of locations designated as off-limits (especially considering that these are also off-limits to commanders), and to maintain awareness that such off-limits orders are being adhered to. It is the responsibility of national commanders to ensure conduct and discipline, and therefore to maintain knowledge that orders and directive relating to conduct and discipline are being implemented and followed by their subordinates.
B. Superior Responsibility
Superior responsibility is the responsibility of non-military, or civilian, leaders for crimes committed by subordinates. The existence of this relationship is also determined in the same manner as a commander/subordinate relationship, by examining effective authority and control.
Within the UN, this will include all levels of superiors up to the SRSG, and possibly even the Secretary-General. As with commanders, a superior must also have effective authority and control over the subordinates in question.
notable difference that there is no requirement of effective command and control. The difference is due to the fact that superior-subordinate relationships differ from commander-subordinate relationships. Command is a military concept without application in a non-military context. Another distinction is that there are likely to be more limitations on the scope of authority and control of a superior. 112 It may be determined that a subordinate's behaviour in the workplace is the only conduct under the effective authority and control of a superior, while actions committed outside this time and location do not fall within the authority and control of the superior.
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There is an additional requirement of superior responsibility, namely that the crimes were within the effective responsibility and control of the superior. This requirement is linked to the concept of effective authority and control. This additional element is again due to the fact that superiorsubordinate relationships are very different to military relationships, in which commanders generally exercise authority and control over all areas of a soldier's conduct. 114 With regard to civilian superiors, if the crimes were not within the competence of the superior to control, they cannot be held responsible. 115 A failure to exercise control properly will be determined in the same manner as those under command responsibility, although duties of a civilian superior may be determined to be different to those of a military commander. 116 Again, this will depend on the particular role and status of the superior.
Mission superiors are in a position to take reasonable measures to attempt to prevent or report crimes by their subordinates due to their authority. 117 Within a peace operation, a civilian superior will have authority and control over mission civilian personnel, which includes the power to appoint and remove (dismiss and repatriate) UN employees. Which subordinates fall within their authority and control will depend on the exact role of the superior, but superiors can exercise both de jure and de facto authority and control over their subordinates. At the highest level, the SRSG has authority and control over the entire mission, over all military and civilian personnel, and thus could be held responsible for crimes committed by either military or civilian personnel. 118 Superiors within the UN are also specifically tasked with the implementation of programmes and policies of the UN for the prevention of SEA, and are assessed on their performance in this implementation. 119 This clearly demonstrates that superiors are expressly given the material abilities (and duty) to prevent such crimes, thus rendering SEA prevention within the effective responsibility and control of UN managers. 120 It also demonstrates that a superior is required to maintain awareness (have knowledge) of misconduct, and once that knowledge is acquired, to act upon such information by referral to the relevant disciplinary channels (eg the CDU and the Office of Internal Oversight). These requirements and assessments would also be clear evidence for the Prosecutor as to whether or not the superior failed to exercise control properly by taking all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress the commission of the crimes, or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 121 Fulfilment by a superior of his/her duties with regard to misconduct would avoid criminal responsibility for not acting on knowledge obtained, but also for consciously disregarding information clearly indicating the commission of crimes. 122 It is clear that 'consciously disregarded information' is a different threshold from that required by command responsibility, as a superior is not
held responsible for what they should have known, but rather, if they consciously disregarded information. This means that a superior will be held responsible if they were put on notice of crimes being committed (or about to be) but did not take action on this information. The standard is generally viewed as being lower than that required by a military commander, due to the fact that a military commander 'would have far more possibilities to receive information on the conduct of their subordinates'. 123 This ability is connected with the realm of authority and control exercised by commanders and superiors, which is greater for military commanders than civilian superiors.
Superiors are held responsible if information clearly indicating a significant risk that subordinates were committing or were about to commit crimes existed and was available to the superior; that the superior 'declined to refer to the category of information'. 124 This is a criterion similar to the 'wilful blindness' concept, which does not presume knowledge, but results in responsibility for ignoring available information. 125 The obligation to not consciously disregard information clearly indicating that subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes differs from the obligations of military commanders, and is seen as a lower threshold than 'should have known'. 126 Again, the reasoning behind the lower threshold is that civilian superior-subordinate relationships are not of the same mould as military commander-subordinate relationships. The military is built on a system of discipline and good order, and a definitive hierarchy based on authority, command and control. This is not the case with regard to superior-subordinate relationships, which are hierarchical, and involve authority, but do not have such an emphasis on command and controlcivilian superiors do not usually have disciplinary powers. 127 However, this does not absolve civilian superiors of any responsibility, although clearly responsibility will be determined based on the individual circumstances of any case. While superior responsibility for crimes of a high-level politician (such as a head of state) is more obvious, such responsibility of lower level superiors will be more challenging to ascertain. However, within the UN, it is the responsibility of superiors to refer any allegations to the appropriate authorities, both within the UN for administrative investigation and disciplinary action (potentially dismissal and repatriation), and with regard to military personnel, to the national contingent commander.
Conclusion
In the broader context, prosecution of peacekeeping personnel superiors and commanders will affirm the principle that the Rome Statute is applicable to all personnel, regardless of their official capacity. 128 The Statute applies 'equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity', and immunities are no bar to the Court exercising its jurisdiction.
heads of state, rather than peacekeepers, that Article 27 was envisioned to cover, it provides the perfect platform for ensuring responsibility for peacekeepers who commit international crimes, and, in particular, superiors and commanders who also attract criminal responsibility for the conduct. The rule imposing responsibility to exercise control and authority over sub-ordinates and prevent criminal conduct is customary international humanitarian law. 132 This means it applies to all authorities involved in armed conflict, which may include periods after a cease-fire; therefore under the majority of circumstances, peacekeeping operations would be included.
Whether subordinates or superiors/commanders, peacekeeping personnel
should not be excluded from responsibility for serious crimes on the basis of their role as peacekeepers. They are protectors rather than belligerents; those who are tasked with advancing human rights and creating a secure and stable environment. 133 As the ICTR has stated, punishment for those who commit war crimes should 'be applicable to everyone without discrimination', as 'international humanitarian law would be lessened and called into question if it were to be admitted that certain persons be exonerated from individual criminal responsibility for a violation of [international humanitarian law] under the pretext that they did not belong to a specific category'. 134 Crimes under the Rome Statute are international crimes; defined as international because they are crimes that shock the consciousness of humanity, and are committed against the world community as a whole, constituting a threat to international peace and security. 135 The commission of international crimes by peacekeeping personnel risks the success of a peace operation through the distrust created in the local population and the global community, resulting in endangerment to both the local population and to international peace and security. Given the vital role of a peacekeeper and the integral link between this role and the success of the mission, any personnel suspected of committing a criminal offence should be prosecuted for such offence, and, where failure to prevent or punish exists, superiors and commanders prosecuted too. 4 Zeid Report (n 3), para 37.
5 Model MoU, Art 7(2) sexiens.
6 Art 7(4) sexiens.
7 Art 7(2) sexiens. 
